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Executive Summary 
This report sheds light on some global trends that are likely to have an impact on Norwegian 
foreign- and development policy in the coming decade. Overall, we see a continuing trend 
away from bilateral diplomacy towards networking of diplomats and non-diplomats, and a 
trend away from international anarchy towards international hierarchy. Decision-making 
power, alliances, and innovation in governance will increasingly take place within transna-
tional networks organized around specific issue-areas. Such networks are often tied in with 
states or formal organizations, such as the UN or the World Bank, but any one actor does not 
dominate them. While we still expect that liberal principles will dominate, the free operation 
of markets is no longer seen as the standard against which other forms of governing must be 
assessed. Moreover, emerging powers’ governing principles are likely to shape debates about 
appropriate forms of global governance. We expect, moreover, to see widespread “hybridiza-
tion” in the form of the merging of issue-areas (i.e. “security-development nexus”) and new 
types of actors (i.e. public-private partnerships).  
 
The global economy: The financial crisis has exacerbated the structural challenge of 
addressing debt (especially in some EU countries, in the US, and in Japan). It has also 
underlined the growing importance of emerging economies, particularly China. "In a 
more long-term perspective, many OECD countries will be facing difficult choices of 
how to reduce public debt and at the same time sustain current welfare systems with 
low fertility levels or increased migration (and the politics that accompany both 
choices). Norway’s robust economy creates some leverage in international politics, and 
will continue to do so in the near future. In the long term, lack of investment in renew-
able energy sources may undercut Norway’s economic and thus political clout in the 
global arena. Norway’s foreign- and development policy seems to be torn between 
emancipatory and pragmatic policy aims. Emancipatory politics, such as supporting de-
velopment in Africa, highlighting humanitarian aid and abetting human rights are a 
source of international prestige. As long as the United States are also focussed on such 
emancipatory policies, Norway’s liberally oriented efforts at social engineering also 
helps promote bilateral relations with the US and European partners. On the other hand, 
there are good pragmatic reasons why Norway should lower its profile in this regard, 
and rather refocus foreign economic and development policy towards the rising powers 
(China, India, Brazil, etc). The way around this dilemma is probably to build up exper-
tise on and social interfaces with the rising powers, so that we have channels through 
which to gauge how much emancipatory politics may be pursued at relatively low 
costs, and also pursue damage limitation when needed.   
 
Global power changes: Asia will exemplify most of the global trends to be expected 
over the coming years and decades, but the US is not in decline, and we are not headed 
towards a genuine multipolar world anytime soon. The EU will be constrained by eco-
nomic challenges in the coming decade, and will be pressed to address internal divi-
sions in an international context where the EU’s relative power is in decline. Nonethe-
less, the EU’s innovation in governance methods – experimental governance – will be a 
source of strength in adapting to and allying with new types of actors on the global 
arena. Non-state agents are increasingly important because state policies will inevitably 
involve working with, through, and towards such actors organized in transnational net-
works. International Organizations will have less institutionalized authority than in the 
past. This presents Norway with a dilemma. It is good realpolitik for small states like 
Norway to be supportive of strong international players and organizations, because in-
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stitutionalization enhances the leeway for small states by making know-how and other 
concrete resources count for more. This points Norway in the direction of supporting 
IOs as major players in global politics. On the other hand, if the overall trend is towards 
networking between different kinds of agents, and if the authority and legitimacy of IOs 
will depend increasingly on success in orchestrating developments in its operational 
environment, then IOs will in a number of cases have to take a back seat to other actors 
in order to get the job done. As such, it may be counterproductive for Norway simply to 
support IOs on principle. Rather, support may have to be forthcoming on a case-to-case 
basis.  
 
Security: Chances of a major great-power conflict seem to be low. A nuclear Iran is a 
major concern, but the detrimental security effects of a nuclear Iran are probably less 
than feared. The demand for energy, and the search for energy security, will almost cer-
tainly be a structural overlay for international politics for a considerable period, but will 
not spill over into interstate conflicts. Control over the “global commons” (cyber space, 
open seas, outer space) is likely to become a more central security issue. In particular, 
cyber security will become more central, as recent “cyber warfare” and public opinion 
in both China and the US show. Since the US remains by far the most important power, 
there is no basic power-political reason for changing the overall Atlantic direction of 
Norwegian foreign policy. However, Norway’s strong attachment to the US calls for a 
matching attachment to the EU, and for a strong interest in the rising powers. Norway 
should ideally run a set of cooperational projects with rising powers. The size of this 
portfolio should mirror the importance of these states. 
 
Climate and the environment: Complexity and the number of intended and unin-
tended consequences affecting the environment will become increasingly difficult to 
manage. The UN shows significant weaknesses in global environmental governance. It 
is the EU, not the UN, which organizes the money needed to help developing countries 
pay for new technology and adapt to climate change. Climate reparations and invest-
ment in green technologies and portfolios related to the conservation of ecosystems 
abroad are efficient strategies for Norway. 
 
Development: With large-scale programmes of social engineering under pressure, new 
arenas for improving lives and helping restructure states are likely to emerge. These 
will increasingly be based on pragmatic partnerships and policies. Norway is well posi-
tioned to help shape the contents of a new paradigm of development policy given its 
concrete and long-term commitment to development, dialogue, peace- and 
reconciliation work, investment in peace operations and peace building efforts. In 
shaping this new paradigm, the government will be constrained by the Norwegian home 
constituency and by increasing demands concerning audits, benchmarking and 
reporting that may easily take the focus away from concrete goal attainment.  
 
Norway’s timely investment in a humanitarian portfolio, including disaster relief and facilitat-
ing, allows Norway the role of information broker in a global context. In contexts where in-
formation is scarce and ambiguous, the need for brokers will be high. Norway’s central posi-
tion as a trusted broker will only be maintained if this position can be maintained through the 
paradigm shift that is likely in the making from social engineering to a more pragmatic focus. 
Increasingly pragmatic policies by ever more important emerging powers such as China and 
India may undermine the market value of Norway’s positions, which is at present strongly 
linked to the liberal regime that these actors are partly challenging.  
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Norway faces a balancing act. The focus should be on hatching policies that will orchestrate 
effective governance with and through non-state actors. This must be done, however, without 
marginalizing the centrality of established international institutions such as the UN. The UN 
is a valuable tool, but it requires updating. Its legitimacy is increasingly being challenged. 
Other arenas such as the G20 are emerging, and might prove more effective in delivering the 
goods. Moreover, new ideas seem to flourish better in transnational networks of governmental 
and non-governmental professional actors with shared interests and complementary expertise. 
Norway should give priority to harnessing the power of such network to innovate on govern-
ance and bringing them into contact with the UN system. For this to happen there is a need to 
uphold and preferably increase our presence within the UN system, and to interact more with 
emerging powers on both state and non-state arenas 
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Introduction 
 
What are the effects of the global financial 
crisis on global and Norwegian develop-
ment aid policy? How are the arenas in 
which Norway is promoting its interest 
affected by a potential power shift from the 
West towards the East? What status and 
role will international organizations central 
to Norwegian foreign- and development 
policy, assume or retain in the context of 
new arenas and processes, like the G20? 
How are the arenas within which develop-
ment policy is formulated, affected? The 
answer to these questions will have a deci-
sive impact on Norwegian foreign- and 
development policies.  
 
Since coherent and assertive answers to 
such wide-ranging questions are almost by 
definition beyond our reach, this report is 
not in any sense of the word a prediction. It 
is logically impossible to explore the future 
empirically, but grounding the report in 
current empirical patterns might facilitate 
and make more realistic the narratives 
about what might come. This document is 
intended to be challenging, to creatively 
explore possibilities for the future, so that 
we do not only have to react to those 
changes on a first-come-first-serve basis. 
The report tries to strike a balance between 
empirical knowledge of the present on the 
one hand, and forecasting possible scenar-
ios for the future towards 2020, on the 
other. We draw on stored academic knowl-
edge and on research carried out specifi-
cally for this report.  
 
The report is therefore not meant to be a 
thorough, empirical investigation of spe-
cific issues, but rather a tool for discussion 
about what future trends might look like 
and what they may imply for Norwegian 
foreign- and development policy. The idea 
is that the report may serve as a launching-
point for discussions about how Norwegian 
policy should be formulated, prioritized 
and managed.  
 
The report is not comprehensive, but deals 
instead with changes in a few select areas: 
the global economy, the global distribution 
of power, changes in security threats, chal-
lenges in climate governance, and trends in 
the broader development agenda. The re-
port moreover discusses two crosscutting 
trends having to do with a likely shift to-
wards more networked modes of govern-
ance, and more hybridization, by which we 
mean the blurring of boundaries between 
established types of actors (public and pri-
vate) and types of governance  (state based 
and market based).  
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In the concluding section, we raise some 
broader questions about Norwegian for-
eign- and development policy and reflect 
on the changing role of the diplomat.  
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1. Global economic outlook and 
effects of the financial crisis 
 
The international financial crisis of 2007-
2009 differed from crises of earlier dec-
ades in that it came from within the states 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) rather 
than from within emerging markets. The 
crisis has engendered a rethinking of what 
is appropriate financial regulation and has 
spurred a reassertion of national govern-
ments through the extension of ‘bail-outs’ 
for domestic financial systems across the 
Western world. The challenges facing the 
Euro notwithstanding, the crisis has not 
and is not likely to cause major political 
crises, or state bankruptcies.  
 
Within OECD states, and within Interna-
tional Organisations, there has been much 
debate about how to institute macro pru-
dential regulation - that is, on a structural 
level - in financial systems so that 
boom/bust excesses can be curbed. De-
bates about ‘right-sizing’ financial systems 
emerged with the financial press and the 
transnational policy community, as well as 
discussions about the importance of ‘host’ 
versus ‘home’ regulations – especially fol-
lowing the Icelandic scandal and the UK’s 
invoking of anti-terror laws to freeze as-
sets. Much of this debate has centred on 
the complexity of financial instruments and 
means to handle them. At the same time, 
financial innovations such as securitization 
are being actively maintained and restarted 
in the Anglophone economies where the 
‘subprime’ markets developed. Quasi-
public institutions, such as Fannie Mae, are 
also being resuscitated due to a political 
need for institutions that can support what 
can be understood as an Anglo-Nordic 
growth model based on debt and consump-
tion. Across the OECD zone the crisis in-
voked a return to Keynesian stabilization 
policies, which were already in effect for 
particular sectors experiencing ‘surplus 
capacity’ problems, such as the automotive 
industry. The crisis extended this economic 
policy behaviour to the financial sector at a 
much larger scale, as well as for the econ-
omy as a whole. Current debates on ‘new 
economic thinking’ have not produced a 
consensus thus far. Nor is one foreseeable.  
 
OECD economies are engaging in a proc-
ess of ‘muddling through’ in finding ways 
to recovery. There is no single solution 
here. Take for example, two ‘champions’ 
that have not seen as crisis: Australia and 
Canada. Both have claimed supremacy in 
policymaking and regulation over their 
financial systems even though their sys-
tems diverge in the size of the non-bank 
sector. In short, no one model predomi-
nates and the national objectives are back 
in the spotlight. This may be seen in a de-
mocratic light – that since the crisis has 
emerged in democracies and tax monies 
have been used by under the notion that 
while finance is global in boom periods, 
bank funerals during the bust are strictly 
national affairs. 
 
“Little will be done through large 
multilateral forums on toughening 
international financial regulation” 
 
In developing countries, the crisis has had 
a clear negative impact on export earnings, 
growth, and unemployment. The crisis has 
been similar to the early-1980s crisis in 
hitting developing countries at a time when 
there was surplus capacity in many interna-
tional markets, leading to a tightening of 
demand for export goods. The key differ-
ence is that removing mediators from the 
supply chain, what is called disintermedia-
tion, of past decades has made emerging 
and frontier economies much less depend-
ent on international bank lending and more 
reliant on short-term debt securities. The 
current and medium-term constraints for 
developing countries are the same now as 
in the past. Historically, developing coun-
tries bounce back from crises faster than 
developed countries, and recovery from 
this crisis should prove that once more. 
The IMF and the World Bank projects, for 
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example, that economic growth in develop-
ing countries will accelerate from 2.4 in 
2009 to 6.3 per cent in 2010 (IMF-WB 
2010). That said, the financial crisis has 
negatively affected developing countries in 
numerous ways. One estimate is that 53 
million more people will remain extremely 
poor because of the crisis (ibid.). More-
over, due to their weaker fiscal structures 
and revenue, developing countries tend to 
lose government revenue in crises and then 
have to borrow, which then contributes to 
new debt. This is a likely scenario from the 
current crisis.  
 
The crisis has provided an opportunity for 
the Bretton Woods institutions to reassert 
some of their authority. The impact of the 
crisis on a number of European countries 
has raised the issue of whether European 
countries should lend from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). The Icelandic 
case further exemplifies the opportunities 
and constraints for the older Bretton 
Woods institutions. While crisis recovery 
is one matter, these institutions lack au-
thority on issues such as financial reform – 
where the mandate will be passed to the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB). We ex-
pect very little to happen on international 
financial reform with respect to ‘hard law’ 
changes, given political sensitivities within 
OECD countries. While ‘soft law’ on trac-
ing financial institutions behaviour will 
increase through the FSB and at regional 
levels, little will be done through large 
multilateral forums on toughening interna-
tional financial regulation. 
 
For the IMF and the World Bank a more 
serious issue regards the role of the market 
within their development and capacity 
building frameworks and programmes. In 
particular, the drive for transparency and 
benchmarking on economic regulations 
must be questioned. Is it better to build 
capacities within closed environments, so 
as to promote easier knowledge transfers? 
Or is it better to rely on external peer pres-
sure for conformity? Such debates should 
take place in the coming decade.  
 
For economic recovery, most forecasts in 
the previous six months have added opti-
mism rather than pessimism. Recent re-
search has shown that the number of peo-
ple living in poverty has decreased in the 
last decade and will continue to do so 
(even if an increase was identified imme-
diately after the crisis). Economically, the 
OECD zone will remain affluent, and 
China, India and potentially Russia will 
converge more towards Western standings 
of living. In the Middle East, Latin Amer-
ica and North Africa the expectations are 
somewhat lower, with curtailed or stag-
nated growth. The worst affected areas, 
which will continue to experience extreme 
poverty, are in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
“The Four Speed World” – Homi Kharas, OECD, 2010  
 
Economy – Implications for Norwegian 
Development Policy 
 
African countries’ needs are great and 
should continue to be the focus for Norwe-
gian development policy. In China and 
India projected growth rates will lead to 
the emergence of a large middle class by 
2025, while the middle classes in Japan 
and middle Europe will decline. 
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Part of the story here is simply fertility 
rates: Within the OECD the US leads the 
fertility table with 2.05 children per 
woman (almost at the replacement level of 
2.1), while Norway has 1.78. All of the 
OECD countries with a fertility rate of 
higher than 1.8, with the exception of 
France, are Nordic or Anglophone (CIA 
2010). They are high-welfare or high-
migration societies.  
 
“Norway has a choice between 
emancipatory and pragmatic policy 
aims” 
 
Despite concerns about intergenerational 
equity, these societies will have fewer 
problems in sustaining their welfare sys-
tems and capacity to support overseas de-
velopment goals from the fiscal pot. In the 
least fertile countries, such as Japan and 
South Korea (both 1.21 births per woman) 
and Southern Europe, maintaining their 
welfare and pension systems will be ex-
tremely difficult and their capacity to sup-
port their own development objectives in-
creasing on the wane. We should also con-
sider China’s importance in this light. 
Given the extremely low fertility in its ur-
ban centres (0.6 births per woman in 
Shanghai City), we are likely to see a large 
skills gap as the current generation of thirty 
and forty-somethings retire and rural Chi-
nese children are up-skilled. Add to this 
the high debt-levels that characterize many 
of these economies, and we get a gloomy 
picture of the economic prospects in these 
countries. Countries with high rates of 
poverty, weak infrastructure, and high birth 
rates, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(with around six births per woman) will 
continue to suffer in coming decades.  
 
 
 
Norway has a choice between value based 
(or “emancipatory”) and pragmatic policy 
aims. To refocus foreign economic and 
development policy towards China and the 
BRIC countries in general is a pragmatic 
response to rising powers. To continue 
with emancipatory aims, such as support-
ing development in Africa, would be more 
in accordance with Norway’s liberal val-
ues, a source of international prestige, and 
in accordance with the normative position 
of the U.S. Here economic and security 
aims must be considered together. 
 
Norway's choice between emancipatory 
and pragmatic strategies should also con-
sider that we are likely to see a period of 
introspection and reshuffling in suprana-
tional and consensus-driven multilateral 
regimes. Within Europe, the Greek debt 
crisis has alarmed the region to the notion 
that the EU is a political union that in-
cludes economies with emerging market 
characteristics, not only the industrial 
powerhouses or service-driven economies 
of the north-west. The Greek crisis has 
exposed the EU's lack of enforcement 
mechanisms and brought the reintroduction 
of the IMF into the European heartland for 
the first time since the mid-1970s. Europe's 
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political centre, Brussels, will have to re-
align with its economic centre, Germany, 
along with voices from the south in the 
coming years. For the World Trade Or-
ganisation the failure of the Doha round 
and proliferation of Preferential Trade 
Agreements  (PTAs) means the end of up-
beat trade multilateralism and an ongoing 
period whereby countries, including Nor-
way, will continue to try to lock countries 
with comparative advantages in resources 
and labour into bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and PTAs. 
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2. Global power and international 
organizations  
 
Asia will exemplify most of the global 
trends to be expected over the coming 
years and decades. China and India, and 
perhaps also Brazil and Indonesia, will 
transform well-known geographical group-
ings and categories as East, West, North, 
South, and bring new stakes and rules of 
the game. The growth of Chinese and In-
dian middle classes will develop a new 
transnationalism while economic and 
population pressures within the OECD 
counties will see a reassertion rather than 
weakening of state power. In addition, in-
creasingly globalized firms will be more 
Asian in orientation to access the new 
middle classes, and will be key agents of 
change. In short, globalization will be in-
creasingly non-western, and the concept 
will increasingly move away from being 
coupled with “Americanization”. This may 
lead to a form of globalization where cul-
tural affinity is more important than basic 
economic opportunity. Related to such a 
development, what are the main questions 
facing Norwegian policy? 
 
The States system 
 
With hindsight, the culmination of the 
post-Second World War economic boom 
and the US defeat in the Vietnam marked 
the beginning of the end of a Euro-centric 
world order. In 1979, China began a reori-
entation towards a market economy. Ten 
years later, India followed. The end of the 
Cold War meant the end of the bipolar 
states system as well. Some twenty years 
later, we know that economic, political and 
cultural globalization brought with it two 
phenomena: a growing challenge from 
other great powers and widespread hy-
bridization (see below). 
 
The transfer of capital from the West to the 
East will continue, but many Asian coun-
tries, above all China, will face drastic in-
creases in ageing populations. Indonesia 
experiences an economic growth of 6-7 
percent, and has a rapidly growing popula-
tion. In time, this will make it one of the 
world’s largest developing economies. 
China and India are undergoing massive 
military build-ups. China, for one, is de-
veloping advanced weapons, aircraft carri-
ers, submarines, and (underground) subma-
rine bases, increasingly in cooperation with 
other aspiring great powers like Brazil. 
Other powers will try to accommodate.  
 
“The US is not necessarily in de-
cline, and we are not headed to-
wards a genuine multipolar world” 
 
As regards China, however, a political 
transition is probably coming in 2012, and 
it may be approaching an economic transi-
tion not very long after. Saving rates are on 
the rise in the US, potentially hampering-
China’s export-led growth model. The of-
ten referred to fact that China holds so 
many dollars is perceived to be a source of 
power, but this is not necessarily so. The 
interdependence in the economic relation-
ship is symmetrical. When interdepend-
ence is balanced, it does not itself consti-
tute a source of power. The dollar is likely 
to remain the major global reserve cur-
rency, owing to the depth and breadth of 
America’s capital markets. There are 
moreover good reasons to measure global 
power positions in much broader terms 
than merely economic and military ones. 
The US’ position in the international sys-
tem, historically and today, is fundamen-
tally determined by the number of alliances 
it can draw upon, which by far outnumbers 
that of China (Ikenberry 2010). This is not 
to say that the US will dominate as before, 
only that to gauge global power shifts, po-
litical capital (measured by number and 
strength of alliances) is important, and the 
US here clearly outperforms China.  
There are also good reasons to interpret the 
growth trajectories of the US and China in 
ways that depart from the conventional 
wisdom about China’s predicted global 
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dominance. The US is not necessarily in 
decline, and we are not headed towards a 
genuine multipolar world anytime soon 
(Brookes and Wohlforth 2008). U.S. ana-
lysts and others have been predicting de-
cline regularly over the years. Neverthe-
less, if we assume that China will follow 
the growth trajectories of two of the most 
rapidly growing nations in the past, Korea 
and Japan, the relative gap in GDP figures 
will probably not have narrowed consid-
erably by 2020 or even by 2030. Moreover, 
the US is still ahead of China in innovative 
capacity and is by the World Economic 
Forum considered the second most com-
petitive economy, with China some 30 
places below. 
Source: Brooks&Wohlforth 2008 
Nevertheless, the relations between the US 
on the one hand, and China and Europe on 
the other, are likely to be a determining 
factor in world politics over the next dec-
ade. More broadly, a central drama con-
cerns rising powers en bloc, often associ-
ated with the BRIC category (Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China). We contend, however, 
that it is better to leave Russia out of this 
equation as far as global power is con-
cerned. As a neighboring country to Nor-
way Russia is of great importance, but its 
significance on the global level is limited 
solely to its nuclear arsenal and its petro-
leum exports. Russia’s economic exertion 
is limited to raw material exports and sun-
set industries, and no effort is invested to 
make the domestic political and economic 
system ready for a globalized market place. 
During the next ten years, Russia will have 
nuisance power, nothing more. The US 
also seems to view matters this way, and is 
likely to treat Russia accordingly (see Box 
1).  
 
 
Box 1:  
 
Russia and the US reactions to the Ice-
landic financial crisis 
 
When Russia stepped up to the plate and 
proposed a loan, Iceland immediately 
broke the news to the US, expecting the 
US to better the Russian proposition. The 
US answer was simply to take note of the 
Russian offer, and to underline that Wash-
ington was glad that someone had offered 
to help. Iceland’s attempt at playing Cold 
War politics had failed, for the simple rea-
son that Iceland’s role as an unsinkable 
aircraft carrier, so important during he 
Cold War, was now held to be of very little 
relevance as seen from Washington. There 
is a lesson to be drawn by Norwegian deci-
sion makers here. During the Cold War, as 
did Iceland, Norway received large eco-
nomic transfers in order to build airports 
and to be ready as a tripwire in the case of 
a Soviet attack in other ways. With the US 
interest in Russia being at its lowest ebb 
for eighty years, there is little room for 
Norway to play the Russia card in order to 
be an interlocutor valuable for the US. In-
terestingly, one of the most important cards 
that Norway has, raw intelligence data gar-
nished from Vardø and elsewhere, is not 
interesting only for what it may tell about 
Russia, but also for the light it sheds on 
matters further afield.  
 
 
The European Union is more likely than 
not to loose its global position relative to 
other great powers. With a shift from a 
transatlantic focus to the relations between 
China and the US, Europe is no longer the 
default option for hammering out global 
deals. This was put on display during the 
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negotiations over climate policies in Co-
penhagen in the fall of 2009. Part of the 
reason for the EU’s relative marginaliza-
tion are therefore of a structural (although 
not given) nature. Nevertheless, part of it 
has to do with internal political dynamics, 
with the Union’s latest territorial expansion 
consuming a lot of political energy. More-
over, there are indications that core states, 
like Germany, have shifted from being a 
consensus-oriented engine of the European 
project to a more assertive one, concerned 
with its relative burden for the European 
project. Moreover, the EU flourished in the 
geopolitical space that emerged after the 
end of the Cold War, which was dominated 
by liberal values propagated by Europe and 
the US. With new powers on the rise that 
selectively resist and challenge these lib-
eral values, the global political landscape 
might not be conducive to Europe’s 
strength as a global actor. Still, the Euro-
pean experiment with new forms of gov-
ernance – the “Open Method of Coordina-
tion” from 2000 being but one example 
(see e.g. Borrås and Jacobsson 2004) – are 
being adopted in a variety of transnational 
governance networks, operating outside of 
or parallel with traditional institutional 
structures. This offers the EU resources 
that can be marshaled to lead in innovating 
new forms of governing, including reforms 
of established international institutions. 
Moreover, as in the past, the EU is more 
likely than not to be able to put together a 
common foreign policy once major internal 
challenges have been resolved. This of 
course hinges on the EU member states 
being able to overcome internal differ-
ences, but given the economic and political 
investments already made in the European 
project, there are good reasons to believe 
that this will be achieved. 
 
International Organizations as actors 
 
International Organizations (IOs) are fac-
ing the challenge of managing a diversity 
of global problems without getting over-
whelmed and overstretched. Particularly 
regionally based organizations are facing 
the challenge of increasingly complex 
transnational threats and issues. UN and 
other post WWII creations risk becoming 
irrelevant unless they adapt to the funda-
mental changes in the operations of the 
global system and the rise of new powers 
and actors (see Reinicke and Deng 2000). 
The growth in new, often private, actors 
that operate effectively at the country level 
in development policy is a challenge to the 
traditional and institutionalized authority 
of IOs. Another challenge concerns legiti-
macy. If IOs are to be seen as the natural 
site for negotiations and governance be-
tween state, bringing in and catering to the 
interests of new powers, like the BRIC 
countries, is of vital importance. The G20 
poses a challenge in this respect, but there 
is also a tendency for the negotiations con-
ducted within the UN to become much 
more fragmented and organized into in-
formal and closed “groups” (observe e.g. 
the “battles” between the G77, “western” 
countries and the secretariat within the UN 
5th committee).  
 
“There is an array of new areas for 
influencing and setting the agenda. 
Private companies, foundations, 
NGOs and regimes are creating 
governance paradigms involving 
states, rather than the other way 
around” 
 
Non-state processes and actors are proliferat-
ing, and one can observe an increasing con-
solidation of standardized models of transna-
tional rule making. Environmental govern-
ance is one of the areas where genuine 
global governance is on the rise, with the 
involvement of an array of non-state actors 
not only contributing but also fundamen-
tally setting up the rules of the game.  
“Global sustainability managers” are emerg-
ing as a profession, and the blueprints for 
nation-state involvement are more often than 
not drawn in the international community 
(Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009).  
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All of this is happening in the absence of a 
centralized organization and points to the 
informal network properties of global gov-
ernance. This means that there is an array 
of new areas for influencing and setting the 
agenda. Private companies, foundations, 
NGOs and regimes are creating govern-
ance paradigms involving states, rather 
than the other way around.  
 
In conclusion, with a proliferation of actors 
and policy networks operating outside of 
the institutionalized spheres of states and 
other collective organizations, Interna-
tional Organizations will have less institu-
tionalized authority than in the past. The 
authority and legitimacy of IOs will in-
creasingly depend on developments in their 
environments and their ability to bring 
about change in those environments. As 
transnational governance networks increas-
ingly become of key importance to author-
ity and influence, making IOs stronger 
requires making them effective hubs for 
such networks of experts, diplomats, bu-
reaucrats, advocates etc. State and non-
state actors will increasingly operate out-
side of formalized international organiza-
tions. Ad-hoc and parallel negotiations 
with smaller groups of states, or actors 
other that states and organizations, will be 
more important in the future. 
 
To this is added some obvious inefficien-
cies of the UN system as an operational 
entity. It is particularly challenged on the 
environment, peacekeeping, and on energy 
(see below).  
 
Implications for Norway 
 
Norway has been and still is a client state 
of the US. This was more clearly exposed 
during George W. Bush’s period in office, 
but despite a change of style, the basics of 
US foreign policy and Norway’s role relat-
ing to this has not changed from the last 
presidential term, or even further back. 
 
Looking beyond 2020, however, the be-
ginning of the start of positioning Norway 
before emerging countries should be now. 
This is not because of any immediate need, 
but as a necessary long-term investment in 
lines of communications with rising pow-
ers. Norway needs to develop further the 
“social interface” with other states and 
peoples. It takes decades to establish con-
tacts and expertise, and particularly so in 
places like China or India, where the in-
vestments needed in knowledge of lan-
guage, history and social mores is substan-
tial.  
 
International Organizations will have less 
institutionalized authority than in the past. 
This presents Norway with a dilemma. It is 
good realpolitik for small states like Nor-
way to be supportive of strong interna-
tional players and organizations, because 
institutionalization enhances the leeway for 
small states by making know-how and 
other concrete resources count for more. 
This points Norway in the direction of 
supporting IOs as major players in global 
politics. On the other hand, if the overall 
trend is towards networking between dif-
ferent kinds of agents, and if the authority 
and legitimacy of IOs will depend increas-
ingly on success in orchestrating develop-
ments in its operational environment, then 
IOs will in a number of cases have to take 
a back seat to other actors in order to get 
the job done. Therefore, it may be counter-
productive for Norway to support IOs on 
principle. Rather, support may have to be 
forthcoming on a case-to-case basis. 
 
“It may be counterproductive for 
Norway to support IOs on principle. 
Rather, support may have to be 
forthcoming on a case-to-case ba-
sis” 
 
The UN’s symbolic role as the most le-
gitimate world institution to date makes it a 
continuing focus for a small state seeking 
increased order in global politics. Nor-
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way’s continued investment in the UN 
provides the country with symbolic capital. 
On the other hand, the UN is also a work-
ing, operational entity, supposed to deliver 
efficiently. The UN’s symbolic capital is 
not alone enough to legitimate the concrete 
work of programmes like the UNDP, WFP, 
UNHABITAT and so on, which operate 
independently in the field. These pro-
grammes are not always capable of effi-
cient delivery on its promises. As a finan-
cial contributor, Norway can harvest sym-
bolic capital, but Norway cannot necessar-
ily increase that capital by channelling 
money to programmes that do not work as 
promised. Norway needs to pay more at-
tention to questions of efficiency, so that 
associations with inefficient programmes 
do not undermine the investment in overall 
symbolic capital.  
 
A pressing need associated with the new 
agents of global governance, is to integrate 
the global with the regional in the UN sys-
tem. This should be a core task for Norway 
in the years to come as an influential 
member in the UN. There exists a degree 
of cooperation between regional organiza-
tions, but there are few channels of com-
munication or streamlining between the 
UN and regional organizations like 
ASEAN, the EU, OAS, the Arab League, 
and the AU. The UN should aim to associ-
ate more closely with these organizations. 
Working towards integrative mechanisms 
in this regard, including advocating for a 
forum in which the UN and regional or-
ganizations can meet and confer, would be 
an efficient Norwegian intervention. This 
would also provide Norway with a new 
channel through which it may learn and 
exchange views with the EU, a develop-
ment that is always welcome not the least 
where coordination of Norwegian and EU 
development policies are concerned.  
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3. Security  
 
Security and geopolitics 
 
As laid out in the preceding section, global 
power dynamics are changing. Rather than 
this resulting in one power becoming 
dominant, however, we expect to see an 
extended period where the major powers - 
the US and China in particular, but also 
India and the EU – have issue-specific and 
thus fragmented as opposed to uniform 
dominance. However, chances of a major 
great-power conflict seem to be low. The 
most discussed scenario, where the United 
States would attack China preemptively in 
order to halt its rise, possibly connected to 
Taiwan, seems to be much too costly to be 
realistic. On this side of 2020, tensions will 
continue to focus on how the US accom-
modates the rise of Brazil, India and China, 
and Russia’s attempts at being noticed, and 
probably even more on how the US will try 
to keep new challenges to the present 
world order from emerging.  
 
As regards the European Union, it will 
have limited time and resources to enhance 
its capability of acting more assertively 
outside of its borders, and might even be 
weakened in this respect in the medium 
term. However, as the “vertical” integra-
tion proceeds, a focus on its inter-
nal/external relations might resurge. This 
might make the Union into a stronger actor 
on the global stage.   
 
Nuclear material is a central, “traditional” 
security concern that will continue to be 
high on the global security agenda in the 
coming decade. The April 2010 Nuclear 
Summit in Washington DC marked a first 
important step towards greater nuclear se-
curity, committing states to increased ef-
forts to gain control over their nuclear ma-
terial. The summit was aimed at addressing 
the threat of nuclear terrorist attacks, and 
forms a part of the broader non-
proliferation agenda of the current US 
President, set out shortly after he took of-
fice. While there is progress on this front, 
Iran seems recklessly determined to ac-
quire nuclear capacity. Even if the US 
should allow Israel the use of Iraqi air 
space and a run at the installations, which 
is a possibility, Iran has learnt from previ-
ous Israeli attacks and is conducting most 
of the work underground. Re-building 
would probably start immediately after a 
potential destruction, meaning that an Is-
raeli attack would not solve the problem, 
but simply postpone it. In a young nation 
where unemployment is high, Iran’s pre-
sent regime seems to be living danger-
ously. A nuclear capability may give a 
boost to national pride, and so help to keep 
the regime in power. Judging by the situa-
tion in Pakistan, however, another regime 
ridden by ethnic and religious tensions, a 
significant pay-off of a nuclear capability 
may prove a chimera. In short, a nuclear 
Iran is a major concern, but the detrimental 
security effects of a nuclear Iran are proba-
bly less than feared or assumed. An impor-
tant part of the motivation for the nuclear 
programme seems to rest with matters of 
domestic legitimacy and Iran’s, and hence 
Shiite, standing within the Muslim world.  
 
As concerns North Korea, the regime’s 
consuming focus seems to be to keep the 
outside world at bay. The result is an ongo-
ing humanitarian catastrophe but despite 
the Cheonan warship incident, we see few 
structural factors that are likely to make for 
any fundamental changes on this side of 
2020. 
 
 
“Failed states” and security 
 
After the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
US as well as “the West” seems to have 
lost moral authority, and a capacity to act 
as “norm entrepreneurs” on the global 
stage (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The 
situation will probably be exacerbated 
when “the West” scales down its efforts in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq. Futile attempts to 
stop Iran from achieving nuclear capacity 
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are yet another factor that will hamper the 
US’ ability to convert domination into de-
sired results. This trend has consequences 
for security far beyond purely military 
policies. With more development models 
on offer (cf. Chinese and Indian activities 
in Africa and elsewhere) and an increasing 
post-colonially informed critique of the 
state-building paradigm that is underlying 
“Western” development policy and peace 
operations, we must ask to what degree the 
overall development strategy as well as the 
so-called liberal peace-building regime 
(seeing as drivers of peace the promotion 
of democracy, market-based economic 
reforms and institutions associated with 
“modern” states) that is part thereof re-
mains viable. The problem with existing 
peace building approaches seems to be that 
it simply does not work very well.  
 
It can be argued that avoiding “failed 
states” means providing global public se-
curity goods, and that this concern should 
override regards for state sovereignty. 
Such an argument fails to recognize the 
fact that identity and we-ness is key to 
solidarity and re-distribution of wealth. 
Regardless of whether an outside observer 
conceives the West’s efforts to make the 
world safe for democracy as the provision 
of a global public good, the fact remains 
that the peoples at the receiving end of 
these policies often seem to prefer less 
involvement or even no involvement at all. 
There are few indications that interpersonal 
loyalty and some collective, global, iden-
tity is in the making, and calls for global 
social contracts seem to be premature at 
best. If not carefully managed, the observa-
tion that loyalty can only stretch so far, can 
come to influence the legitimacy of Nor-
wegian state-funded external support. 
 
Hitherto, one central issue in rebuilding 
states to increase the global public security 
good, has been the introduction of “good 
governance” into the fabric of these socie-
ties. Indicators such as democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law often define 
“good governance”. In the face of what 
might be a declining and inefficient liberal 
paradigm, increasing resource scarcity, and 
the impact of the financial crisis, one alter-
native to an all-encompassing “good gov-
ernance” agenda, is to focus on providing 
infrastructure. Such realignment would not 
skirt all problems, since the provision of 
goods by outsiders will at least in some 
degree play into the hands of local patrons 
who will find ways to use the new re-
sources to shore up already existing pa-
tronage systems. However, since we know 
of no historical or current political system 
where this is not to some degree the case, 
this should be considered a valid but not 
particularly relevant counter argument.   
 
Human security 
 
 
 
There has been a steady decline in battle 
deaths per year, and conflicts have de-
clined since the end of the Cold War. 
However, armed conflicts per se has in-
creased between the 1960s and 1990-1, 
especially intra state conflicts (from 12 in 
1960 to 49 in 1991). As the figure below 
shows (CSCW/PRIO), armed conflicts are 
now at the same level as during the 1970s, 
and much higher than during the 1950s and 
beginning of the 1960s. The share of civil-
ian casualties has increased throughout the 
century.  
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Incidents of terrorism has also increased, 
but dropped as of lately (including the 9/11 
attacks).  
 
Because of this, security and development 
concerns have gradually become inter-
linked into a hybrid form. Two previously 
distinct policy areas are now increasingly 
overlapping in terms of the actors and 
agencies engaged, and in terms of the pol-
icy prescriptions that are advocated. The 
human security approach exemplifies the 
security-development nexus.  
 
However, the sustained importance of na-
tional- and state security is manifest, and 
was revived by the 9/11 attacks. It is likely 
that “human security” will not be accepted 
as a conceptual framework or policy tool 
for national governments towards 2020. 
There is essentially a consensus that tradi-
tional notions of security are not satisfac-
tory in describing the present state of the 
world, but the consensus ends there. It is, 
however, possible to work to influence 
such perceptions by involving new actors 
in strategies of legitimation (see below on 
perceptions of security). 
 
Energy and security 
 
An increasing focus is being put on energy 
security due to several factors: the pros-
pects of “peak oil”, the reliance on unsta-
ble and authoritarian regimes for energy 
supply, and of course the competition for 
energy between states, notably major pow-
ers. Furthermore, the general trend is that 
demand for electricity will rise by ap-
proximately four percent per year towards 
2020 (Argiri and Birol 1999). This explo-
sive growth in demand from emerging 
markets, especially in Asia, and increasing 
state-control in energy markets lessens the 
likelihood that market forces alone will 
correct the supply-demand imbalance 
when it comes to energy and resources. 
Some are concerned that concerns with 
energy security will inaugurate a new era 
in international politics, with increased 
geopolitical rivalry and “resource national-
isms” (Umbach 2009) meaning that states 
take or seek to take direct and increasing 
control of economic activity in natural re-
source sectors (Ward 2009). China and 
India’s investments in Africa and else-
where are often driven by a concern with 
energy security. Furthermore, the Obama 
administration’s decision to open up for 
more drilling (even if put on halt after the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill), as well as the 
efforts to transition to a green economy, is 
driven by the same concerns. By implica-
tion, reducing US reliance on energy sup-
plies from unstable regimes in the Middle 
East becomes a primary goal. The Euro-
pean Union, meanwhile, has made energy 
security a top priority. This shapes its rela-
tions with Russia and other energy export-
ing countries, effectively undermining the 
Union’s broader political advantage. 
 
Global demand for energy will continue to 
increase despite the possibility of a slow-
ing down of global economic growth in the 
next decade. The World Energy Outlook 
projects global energy demand to increase 
with 44% by 2030, most of the demand 
coming from non-OECD countries 
(IEA/OECD 2009). For the next decade 
and beyond, the response to this demand 
will likely be coal-based. Coal is relatively 
inexpensive and widely available relative 
to other sources of energy. As seen in fig-
ures 14 and 17 below, projections suggests 
that the composition of energy sources 
over time will remain stable. Oil, coal, and 
natural gas will dominate also in the future. 
 - 20 -
At a more structural level, the time lag 
between the emergence of new sources of 
energy and its widespread adoption is es-
timated to at least 20 years. This helps ex-
plain why hydroelectricity will dominate as 
a renewable source of energy, despite in-
vestments in other forms of renewable en-
ergy.  
 
The demand for energy, and the search for 
energy security, will almost certainly be a 
central structural overlay for international 
politics for a considerable period. There 
will be international nuisances and political 
and economic posturing. However, energy 
security will only become a source of more 
general insecurity in combination with 
other factors. Furthermore, only if such 
forces combine in particular geographical 
areas at specific junctures will they to-
gether have the potential to fuel violent 
conflicts on a large scale. While there will 
be competition for resources, there are few 
reasons to expect such competition alone 
to manifest itself as outright conflict be-
tween major powers. 
 
Norway is one of the world’s richest coun-
tries, one of the world’s biggest oil and gas 
exporters, one of the world’s largest emit-
ters of climate gases, and a country richly 
endowed with other natural resources, in-
cluding ample hydropower. Norway there-
fore faces some serious and difficult ques-
tions as its petroleum extraction expands 
northwards to new areas. Supplying petro-
leum helps to keep the price of oil and gas 
down, and complicates the development of 
renewable forms of energy. On the other 
hand, reducing the flow of hydrocarbons 
from Norway may also promote the in-
creasing use of coal. Such dilemmas will 
need to be confronted and analyzed more 
extensively in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceptions of security 
 
Security is not only dependent on material 
and objective conditions. As an illustration 
of the importance of how much percep-
tions matter, one can analyze whether the 
end of the Cold War has altered the pat-
terns of war. It actually has not. War is less 
common, and battle deaths have declined, 
but what is often termed “new” wars or 
new types of conflict, are not really new at 
all. What has changed is that these types of 
wars – intrastate wars – have received in-
creasing attention in the last 50 years, and 
particularly since the 1990s. The absence 
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of heavy weaponry and superpower sup-
port is, generally, what makes these wars 
result in fewer battle deaths. This, how-
ever, does not make the conflicts substan-
tially “new” (Kalyvas 2001).  
 
What counts as a security issue is not con-
stant or given, but depends on how it is 
defined and perceived. As examples, ter-
rorism was perceived as a problem of do-
mestic crime in the 60s, but is now on top 
of the global security agenda. There are 
attempts to “securitize” climate change, 
that is, to bring the problem and corre-
sponding severity of measures on equal 
standing to for example interstate wars, but 
these have so far been unsuccessful. The 
point here is that such “securitization” 
cannot be understood without reference to 
perceptions, which are often heavily 
shaped by elite and lobby groups, cam-
paigns, the media and advocacy groups 
(Buzan, Waever, de Vilde 1998).  
 
Against this backdrop, it is instructive to 
reflect on more or less likely developments 
in threat perceptions and security discourse 
in the future: Migration and energy are 
now both being “securitized”. Climate 
change has not been successfully securi-
tized, thus lacking the corresponding ex-
traordinary measures that would have be-
come legitimate. It is not likely that this 
will occur in the absence of any extraordi-
narily big, climate related cataclysm that 
brings immense human or natural devasta-
tion.  
 
More broadly, a major change has occurred 
over the past five years in American and 
global perceptions about China. It is now 
seen as a major power almost on a par with 
the US. This results not only from China's 
current capabilities but also particularly 
from the speed of its growth, the scale of 
changes occurring, and not least projected 
trajectories. This attention in and of itself, 
can affect security assessments. Vice versa, 
while 41% of Americans believe they are 
staying ahead of China in terms of innova-
tion, 81% of the Chinese thinks the same 
of the US (McGinn 2009).  
 
 “Self-fulfilling prophecies” are therefore 
worthy of notice. Pew Research (2010) 
reports that perceptions of China's increas-
ing power could boost anti-Chinese senti-
ment in the years to come. In the US, such 
sentiments are already shaping domestic 
policies. Senator Charles Schumer, for 
example, demanded that money from the 
economic stimulus package to a joint ven-
ture between a US and a Chinese company 
aimed at shifting towards a green econ-
omy, be withdrawn. In Western Europe, 
worries about China's economic power are 
also on the rise. 
 
Implications for Norway 
 
Since the US remains by far the most im-
portant power, there is no basic power-
political reason for changing the overall 
Atlantic direction of Norwegian foreign 
policy. Norway has predicated its alliance 
policy on a quid pro quo with the US. In 
exchange for US support in contingencies, 
Norway supports and participates in US-
initiated international operations in Af-
ghanistan, and partially in Iraq. This re-
mains a viable overall security strategy.  
 
Two caveats should nonetheless be noted. 
First, over the last forty years, the EU has 
slowly but surely organized its own de-
fense capability. Integration has also inten-
sified along other relevant tracks. The cost 
for Norway of standing outside the EU 
increases proportionally. Norway will have 
problems remaining integrated with other 
European forces, as EU-based ones in-
creasingly join NATO’s mechanisms. To 
the degree that the EU’s security consoli-
dation causes friction with the US, Norway 
will be caught in the middle. Furthermore, 
and potentially, if Russia wants to send a 
message to the US, the EU, or both at as 
low a cost as possible by picking on a bor-
dering country, the logical choice is the 
country that is not a member of the EU. 
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Norway’s strong attachment to the US 
calls for a matching attachment to the EU. 
 
With a view to the long term, Norway’s 
overarching interest lays in a well-
organized world order where Norway may 
further develop its export-based economy 
without becoming so politically visible that 
visibility may cause economic problems or 
even problems of terrorism (cf. the cartoon 
crisis). As such, the strong attachment to 
the US also calls for a strong interest in the 
rising powers. Norwegian ties to other 
poles in the system may dampen to some 
degree the impression that Norway is the 
US’ European henchman. At the very least, 
Norway needs the knowledge and the po-
litical and economic contacts necessary to 
follow how these states think about its own 
position in global politics, the position of 
the US and the EU, and also the role of 
small and rich states like Norway.  
 
A US-centered security policy remains 
Norway’s most obvious option. With an 
eye on the political costs vis-à-vis the EU 
and the rising power, however, we would 
like to make the case for pitching support 
for US military operations more as what it 
is, namely Realpolitik, and less as norma-
tive support for an American-led, liberal 
world. 
 
Furthermore, Norway should ideally run a 
set of cooperational projects with rising 
powers. The size of this portfolio should 
mirror the importance of these states. This 
is not the case at present. For example, 
during Brazil’s recent state visit, it turned 
out that there was very little cooperation 
between the two countries, particularly 
outside of the economic sphere. Consider-
ing that Brazil is the rising power with 
which there are presumably the least cul-
tural and economic hindrances for coopera-
tion, this situation is suboptimal. 
 
As a neighboring power, Russia remains of 
key importance to Norway. This is well 
understood – witness, for example, the 
enthusiastic responses to territorial delimi-
tations in the Barents Sea – and so need not 
concern us here. Where Russia’ role in 
global politics overall is concerned, how-
ever, it is overrated in Norwegian dis-
course. It is hardly surprising that what is 
important for Norway is not necessarily 
important for the world. At present, the 
Arctic is not “securitized”. With increased 
attention given to environmental or climate 
issues, and particularly given the likeli-
hood of there being increased shipping in 
the area due to melting ice, this may 
change, but it is unlikely to change before 
2020. Russia does not have enough sym-
bolic power to securitize the area by itself, 
no matter how many metal flags it places 
on the seabed. Neither are there indications 
that the Arctic will become a great security 
concern for US policymakers on this side 
of 2020.  
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4. Climate and the environment  
 
Population growth, economic growth, and 
energy demand 
 
Just as in the global economic crisis, in 
questions of biodiversity and the environ-
ment, natural capital is used faster than it 
can be replenished, leaving future genera-
tions more environmentally impoverished. 
The human population of the planet is ex-
pected to reach eight billion by 2025 (UN 
2008). Almost all of this population growth 
will take place in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. Combined with rapid economic 
growth, this will lead to increases in de-
mands for natural resources and energy.   
 
Climate change will probably worsen the 
resource scarcities of a growing popula-
tion, but as the impact of climate change 
will vary by region, so will the impact of 
changes in agricultural productivity. De-
clines will be located mainly in sub-
Saharan Africa, and could be devastating 
for both their economies and for people’s 
subsistence.  
 
As seen in the preceding section on energy 
security, the demands for electricity will 
rise by four percent per year towards 2020 
and beyond. The supply will mainly come 
from coal-powered electricity plants. From 
2006 to 2012, it is estimated that China and 
India will have built 800 new coal plants, 
the CO2 emission from which will repre-
sent five times the savings of the Kyoto 
regime (Zakaria 2008: 90). 
 
Increasing energy consumption and cli-
mate changes also lead to health conse-
quences. Climate change is not affecting 
the environment in isolation. Climate 
change is intimately linked to the spread of 
diseases, such as malaria in increasing wet-
land areas, decline in agricultural produc-
tion, and violent weather.  
 
Particularly in the area of climate and the 
environment, the challenge to policymak-
ers is the convergence and interaction of 
these multiple trends and concerns, at the 
same time as one will have to cope with 
the impact of new players. Complexity and 
the number of intended and unintended 
consequences affecting the environment 
will become increasingly difficult to man-
age.  
 
Climate governance 
 
The UNEP is not functioning according to 
the intention. UNEP has been relative ef-
fective in monitoring, assessing, and 
launching environmental agreements. It 
has failed in managing policy processes, to 
establish benchmarks and “best practices”, 
and has not established itself as an institu-
tional home for environmental initiatives 
and conventions. Because of the govern-
ance structure, the emphasis is still put on 
the interests of member states instead of 
the mission of the organization. Because of 
the financial structure, UNEP is used as a 
tool by states to promote their own agendas 
rather than financing public goods activi-
ties. It is not an institutional home for envi-
ronmental regimes (Ivanova 2005). This 
might correspond to the increasing prolif-
eration of private organizations with the pri-
mary goal of devising transnational rules for 
environmental governance (cf. pages 14-15 
in this report). One can observe a shift from 
networks lobbying rule makers to making 
and implementing the rules themselves. This 
can further be seen as a response to demands 
that global governance should use innovative 
forms of cooperation among different social 
sectors, something at which UN organiza-
tions like UNEP can be seen as having 
failed.  
 
Consequently, the soundness end effec-
tiveness of the advice from the Norwegian 
“St. melding 13” to “strengthen UNEP, 
especially as regards its core function, 
which is surveillance of the global state of 
the environment and give recommenda-
tions on the governance of natural re-
sources”, is not evident. 
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There is, however, a broader field of non-
state processes in which issues are defined, 
rules made, and compliance with rules are 
monitored. In the governance of the envi-
ronment, some prominent examples are “The 
Global Reporting Initiative” that publishes 
“Sustainability Reporting Guidelines” that 
now forms a part of the strategies of both 
states and multinational corporations. Fur-
thermore, the “Forest Stewardship Council” 
has established a global certification scheme 
for responsibly managed timber. The Marine 
Stewardship Council has an equal certifica-
tion scheme for fisheries (Dingwerth and 
Pattberg 2009).  
 
What do these institutions have in common? 
Besides operating beyond any centralized 
institutional authority, they often include a 
wide range of stakeholders, often in quasi-
parliamentary bodies that serve as governing 
organs, and they focus on process over sub-
stance. As such, these international govern-
ance networks gain increasing legitimacy in 
the environmental realm by being inclusive, 
accountable, deliberative, and focussing on 
public relations.  
 
Carbon markets 
 
The carbon market is an important compo-
nent on emissions trading, specifically ad-
dressing emission of carbon dioxide. Trade 
in emissions, or cap-and-trade, is a politi-
cal system set up to give economic incen-
tives to reducing emissions. A cap is set by 
a government body, and up to the level of 
this cap, e.g. industries can trade emission 
allowances so that those activities who 
need to emit more can buy allowances 
from those who need to emit less. The de-
sired goal is that the most cost-efficient 
ways of reducing emissions will prevail in 
the market. As in any other markets, a 
capital base is needed, and coordination of 
markets and standards on a global scale is 
desirable. Developing countries, e.g. in 
Africa, should in principle be in a position 
to benefit from carbon markets through 
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM), 
as the demand for Certified Emissions Re-
ductions (CERs), or climate credits, in-
creases. Projects to reduce emissions in 
Africa could “sell” their climate credits to 
industrialized countries that need higher 
emission allowances.  
 
A connected strategy is to pay developing 
countries directly to develop climate 
friendly projects and industries. The EU, 
not the UN, is the leader in organizing the 
money to help developing countries pay 
for such new technologies and adapt to 
climate change (about 100 billion per 
year). In addition, the EUs carbon market 
is already the worlds largest, and the big-
gest contributor to emission controls in 
developing countries 
 
“When the current Kyoto protocol 
runs out in 2012, the whole carbon 
market might go under with it” 
 
However, and mainly because of US reluc-
tance to invest in a serious federal climate 
policy, the market is not efficient enough 
to reach the emission reduction goals.  
 
A successor to the Kyoto accords could 
potentially greatly increase the size of this 
market, as could an extension of the cap-
and-trade system in the US. However, the 
latter is improbable and the former is un-
certain. When the current Kyoto protocol 
runs out in 2012, the whole carbon market 
might go under with it. 
 
The Kyoto accords were based on the idea 
that the West set the premises through ne-
gotiation, and the “third world” would fol-
low to solve the problem. This is an even 
more problematic assumption today. A 
solution or renewal of Kyoto will require a 
broad coalition from the start, including the 
private sector, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, cities and localities, and the media. 
As opposed to taxes, tariffs, and even wars, 
states now have less room to manoeuvre on 
these fronts, and need more subtle and so-
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phisticated ways to effect change. This is 
connected to the increasing general impor-
tance of hybridity and networks in solving 
problems of global governance, as laid out 
elsewhere in this report. More specifically, 
any such solution must include China.  
 
China 
 
China is the embodiment of general trends 
that has been identified in Asia: rapid eco-
nomic development and rising living stan-
dards, globalization of trade and increasing 
demand for Asian natural resources, the 
rise of science and technology, an explod-
ing energy demand, post-Kyoto mitigation 
approaches, and population growth and 
urbanization.  
McKinsey (2009) has estimated that total 
number of vehicles in China alone will rise 
from 26 million in 2003, to 120 millions in 
2020. Twenty six percent of the water in 
China’s river systems is so polluted that 
they have “lost the capacity for basic eco-
logical function” (Zakaria 2008:98). Of 
Chinas about 570 million urban residents, 
only one percent breathe air considered 
safe by EU standards.  
Many such figures, however, come from 
the Chinese government itself. It has 
placed environmental considerations 
higher on its agenda than most developed 
countries. Senior Chinese officials talk 
about the need for green GDP and growth 
with balance, and environmental concerns 
figure prominently in Hu Jintao’s plan for 
a “harmonious society” (Fan 2006).  
 
Fatih Berol, the chief economist of the 
International Energy Agency, was asked 
which country had the most environmen-
tally conscious government. Most people 
expected him to mention Norway or an-
other Scandinavian country. Instead, he 
named China. 
 
 
Box 2: 
 
Chinas energy-efficiency drive 
 
As the world’s top emitter, China is ahead 
of the curve in developing energy efficient 
solutions. Daniel Esty (2007) of Yale Uni-
versity observes that  
 
“China has  adopted fuel-economy stan-
dards that will push average car mileage to 
nearly 40 miles a gallon over the next five 
years, … And it has promised to reduce 
water pollution by 10 percent by 2020 and 
increase industrial solid waste recycling by 
60 percent. These aren’t just empty prom-
ises. The State Environmental Protection 
Agency, which recently acknowledged that 
air- and water-quality levels are worsening, 
blocked 163 projects worth USD99 billion 
in 2006. Start-up companies are being 
launched every day to develop pollution-
control technologies, improve energy effi-
ciency, and create alternative sources of 
power. The USD220 million in clean-tech 
venture capital China received in 2006 puts 
it ahead of Europe as a venue for new envi-
ronmental companies”. 
 
 
Climate reparations and Green Economy 
 
Climate reparations means transferring 
money from “the West”, responsible for 
the bulk of emissions, to developing coun-
tries to facilitate climate friendly solutions 
and reduce the potential for future emis-
sions in these countries. This issue has 
become salient as a response to the fact 
that equity has been low on the agenda so 
far. For a global solution to be perceived as 
broadly legitimate, it must probably assign 
responsibility both for the historical stock 
and for the current emissions. One alterna-
tive is for Western countries to cut emis-
sions radically, permitting other develop-
ing states to expand theirs. That is proba-
bly politically unviable. Another alterna-
tive is for “Western” countries to pay de-
veloping countries directly for cutting their 
emissions to free their resources to adopt 
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environmentally friendly technologies and 
solutions. The amount of money needed 
for this to avoid developing countries mak-
ing up for industrialized countries’ emis-
sions cuts, was one of the issues in the Co-
penhagen summit. 
Bolivian President Evo Morales has called 
for a nearly $700 billion annual transfer to 
developing states for “climate reparations”. 
Some European states have proposed be-
tween $3  - $10 billion per year from 2010 
through to 2012. The EU plans to transfer 
more than $20 billion annually by 2020, 
and estimates nearly $150 billion needed 
per year by 2020. The World Bank found 
that poor states would need $75 to $100 
billion annually for the next 40 years, 
whilst Oxfam has suggested a $50 billion 
annual compensation fund to do the job. 
No concrete numbers are associated with 
potential US donations. 
In this respect, the Norwegian promise to 
“[consider direct compensation to protect 
ecosystem services]” (st melding 13) 
should be considered an understatement. 
 
A Green Economy would take seriously 
the mutual dependency of humans and the 
ecological systems in which they live. A 
fundamental transition from “black” eco-
nomic activity, like coal and oil, to renew-
able energy sources would create new 
“green jobs”, and a more sustainable eco-
nomic development, as well as reducing 
environmentally harmful activities. It can 
also be argued that such transition would 
give more direct economic advantages. 
 
The loss of forests, for one, is costing the 
global economy between 2.5 trillion and 
4.5 trillion a year, for example through 
lower revenues due to lower harvests and 
the investment in new procedures to ex-
tract timber. Protecting and restoring dam-
aged ecosystems can deliver extraordinar-
ily high rates of return on investment, es-
timated to be 40, 50, or even 80 percent 
(UN 2009). The next step could be to turn 
ecosystem services into a viable portfolio 
option for large investors – such as the 
Norwegian pension fund – and to generate 
the capital needed to carry out large-scale 
conservation efforts.  
 
Furthermore, there will be an increasing 
need for development policies directed 
specifically towards adaptive programs to 
deal with environmental change. Combin-
ing structural incentives for inversions in 
ecosystem conservations, and hybrid pro-
grams on a micro level, combining devel-
opment and environmental conservation, to 
create economic gain and “green jobs”, is 
an area that will receive more attention.  
 
Implications for Norway 
 
There is a fine line between Norway as a 
pioneer country (“foregangsland”) and 
narcissism. Carbon capture and storage for 
one, is extremely expensive, but do have 
an important effect internationally on 
Norway’s image as a pioneer in environ-
mentalism. However, the money could 
have been used, perhaps more efficiently, 
in other countries to e.g. increase energy 
production efficiency (CCS has the oppo-
site effect), or to support gas-fired over 
coal-fired power plants. Likewise, uncon-
ditional support for UN environmental 
efforts and UNEP, means giving a lot of 
money to inefficient organizations to sup-
port our own self-image as a nation. This is 
connected to what we call “driving in the 
home view mirror” below, referring to how 
ones self-image is more important in shap-
ing policy responses than a thorough 
analysis of the problem to be addressed. In 
climate policy, this is not necessarily pio-
neering or progressive.  
 
In climate policy, Norway should support 
what is effective, and dampen the dis-
course of exceptionality or pioneering. 
Supporting integrative and cross-cutting 
hybrid projects of providing development 
through green economies and green jobs, 
investing in environmentally friendly tech-
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nologies, and through this addressing 
health concerns, should be a priority area. 
This is on the surge internationally. 
 
 
 
 
 - 28 -
5. Development policy 
 
As a political project aimed at transform-
ing developing countries, development 
policy has grown increasingly ambitious 
over time. Conventional wisdom has it that 
the now degraded “social engineering” 
mode of development policy of the 1960s 
and 1970s is now firmly replaced by a 
paradigm that places a much higher pre-
mium on the rights and needs of the indi-
vidual. The latest culmination of this trend 
can be found in the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs), which gives concrete, 
measurable targets for individual-level 
improvements in human development. 
Still, social engineering – the idea that 
some actors have privileged access to the 
dos and don’ts of how to achieve economic 
growth and poverty reduction and thus also 
the right and obligation to tell others to act 
accordingly – is as strong today as before, 
although in a slightly different form. 
 
Development policy over the last two to 
three decades have been focused on soft-
ware, not hardware, with social engineer-
ing being much more intrusive, operating 
at the level of the skills, identity, education 
and capacity of the individual, and on the 
rules and resources of state institutions. 
This is, in turn, is grounded in a discourse 
of rights, giving development policy a 
more explicitly moral and absolutist tone. 
Two things stand out as explanations for 
the contents of today’s development para-
digm. Firstly, professional groups in many 
cases have the power to set the terms for 
the policy debate (experts operating in for-
eign ministries, NGOs, think tanks, and 
IOs). Secondly, donors have a tendency to 
drive in the “home-view mirror”, that is, to 
listen to and be shaped by the concerns of 
key constituencies at home in defining 
policy and setting priorities, which often 
(though not necessarily) conflict with those 
of the intended beneficiaries of develop-
ment policies.  
 
Against the backdrop of the failures to in-
stitutionalize good governance and peace 
in many fragile states, the ambitious, large 
scale programmes of social engineering 
and democratization may move out of 
fashion, and new arenas and strategies for 
improving lives and helping restructure 
states is likely to emerge. These will in-
creasingly be based on pragmatic partner-
ships and policies.  
 
China will continue to expand into the Af-
rican continent, and consequentially to 
provide new models for development. 
China is not operating with strict “condi-
tionalities” and does not expose the same 
value-based expansionist tendencies as the 
West. The implications of a potential shift 
in the overall level of ambition and areas 
of priority within fragile states will pose a 
huge challenge for Norwegian foreign and 
development policy.  
 
“Ambitious, large scale programmes 
of social engineering and democrati-
zation may move out of fashion, and 
new approaches for development- 
and post-conflict reconstruction is 
likely to emerge.” 
 
The demand to demonstrate results and 
impact is likely to shape future develop-
ment policies in significant ways. Con-
cerns with accountability have become a 
driving force of innovation in how devel-
opment is practiced, resulting in ever more 
sophisticated techniques for monitoring 
and evaluating aid projects, often termed 
“results based management” or the like. 
This has resulted in a tendency to prioritize 
discussions about “doing things right” – 
i.e. demonstrate “effect” measured as out-
put, not outcomes – over the more impor-
tant ones of “doing the right things”. This 
also affects accountability, in that account-
ability towards donors often is at the ex-
pense of accountability to those affected by 
governance measures. This trend is likely 
to continue as publics in main donor coun-
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tries are concerned with fraud and corrup-
tion in aid funding. Briefly put, a focus on 
efficient delivery of outputs tends to over-
shadow the broader discussion on the very 
nature of the outputs, or the outcomes of 
specific policies or projects.  
 
Approaches to fragile states will dominate 
debates on development policy, together 
with hybrid models on how to link climate 
change and development policy through 
investments in forest management and 
search for replacements to coal as a main 
source of energy. A risk as far as Norwe-
gian policy is concerned is that develop-
ment policy, thus defined, will be much 
less about poverty reduction and emancipa-
tion in developing countries, and much 
more about global challenges – climate 
change and global instability and risks 
(fragile states). Such a transition will imply 
that developing countries become not so 
much ends in and of themselves, but loca-
tions where global challenges (as viewed 
from the rich parts of the world) are sought 
addressed.  
 
An indication of how the emerging logic of 
hybridity is affecting the development 
paradigm is how humanitarian work is 
becoming politicized from within by being 
fused with development. It is apolitical, yet 
political. For example, humanitarianism 
should include promoting human rights, 
and not having contact with e.g. the Tali-
ban in Afghanistan – inherently political 
statements. It is challenged from without, 
as civilians and humanitarian workers are 
increasingly becoming targets in conflicts, 
and military troops are delivering humani-
tarian aid as a “force multiplier”. The latter 
trend points to the prevalence of the former 
– humanitarians are political actors, be-
coming more involved in development.  
 
Food and resources 
 
Because of the growth in population and 
wealth, and new dietary preferences 
spurred by a growing middle class, an in-
creasing food demand will require an in-
crease in crop yields from three tons per 
hectare at the current level, to four tons by 
2025. 
 
Whilst the World Bank estimates that de-
mand for food will rise by 50 percent by 
2030, a UNEP projection estimates that 
agricultural productivity could drop by the 
same percentage in many developing coun-
tries by 2080. This might be connected to 
climate change: changing patterns of rain-
fall, melting of ice and snow, and draughts 
(see above on climate change) 
 
Water shortages are also more frequent, 
especially for irrigation purposes and agri-
cultural production. These problems will 
probably only worsen because of rapid 
urbanization.  Due to the increase in popu-
lation combined with a changing environ-
ment, countries categorized as cropland or 
freshwater scarce is likely to increase from 
21 countries today, to 36 countries by 
2025. That would amount to an increase of 
1.4 billion people (among the newcomers 
are Burundi, Colombia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Malawi, Pakistan, and Syria). 
 
These scarcities are increasingly also con-
tributing sources of violent clashes. Food- 
and water shortages are furthermore his-
torically a driving force for population 
movements, and in the near future, we 
might see population movements of tens of 
millions of people. 
 
Good governance and effectiveness of aid 
 
The liberal “good governance” paradigm, 
emphasising human rights, solid public 
institutions, democracy and the rule of law 
as indicators of legitimacy, is likely to fal-
ter. There is considerable fatigue in terms 
of whether it is effective, and developing 
countries are overwhelmed with ever more 
refined “solutions” formulated by western 
technocrats (see box 4).  
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Box 3:  
 
Number of governance reforms sug-
gested in each year’s World Develop-
ment Report1 1996-2003: 
 
1997:   45 
1998:    75 
1999/2000:  66 
2000/2001:   106 
2001/2002:   100 
2002/2003:   116 
 
 
A recent review by the Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World 
Bank concluded, for example, that there is 
no conclusive evidence as to whether the 
good governance agenda actually captures 
the determinants of aid effectiveness. A 
key case is Bangladesh, whose growth 
rates have been high over a sustained pe-
riod in the absence of the policy and insti-
tutional framework suggested by the good 
governance agenda. 
 
There is a clear impact of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) at the global 
level. Forty countries have had debts can-
celled; aid has increased substantially; 
there have been major advances on the 
control of tuberculosis and other signifi-
cant diseases. Recent data also documents 
that finally, maternal health has improved. 
Still, at the country levels, the advances are 
less clear. MDGs are in cases not suffi-
ciently integrated into national strategies 
and donor plans.  
 
Following the general trends suggested in 
the report, critical factors for the 
achievement of a MDG framework after 
2015 are the diversification of funding and 
partners in networks, the growing 
inequalities between countries, the likely 
increased importance of the G20, a 
difficult context for public expenditures 
and potential decline of support for aid and 
                                                 
1 Source: Grindle (2006) 
aid volume, and the impacts of 
demographic changes and climate change.  
Towards 2020, one might observe an 
increasing focus on global and national 
roles and the division of labour in 
development - who’s going to do what and 
the roles of different actors, especially in 
terms of funding and accountability. Over 
time, a transition to a new development 
paradigm will probably take place, with 
less emphasis on moral absolutes, less 
ambition in terms of social and political 
transformation, and much more on “good 
enough governance”. This is driven in part 
by structural factors, like China’s entry 
into the game, in part by the emergence of 
a clear issue-linkage between development 
and other issues (security and climate 
change being the two most important), and 
by internal debates among development 
professionals as to the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of current policies.  
To sum up, development policy has been 
changed after a series of crises in finance, 
food, fuel, and climate. A fundamental 
discussion on the changing nature of de-
velopment is needed. There is no consen-
sus on whether good governance makes for 
effective uses of aid. This should have im-
plications for aid for poverty reduction, 
and for development policies.  
 
Implications for Norway 
 
Norway is well positioned to help shape 
the contents of a new paradigm and to con-
structively partake in the critique of the 
prevailing paradigm for how to approach 
poverty reduction as well as post-conflict 
reconstruction. This is so because of its 
long-term commitment to development, 
dialogue, peace- and reconciliation work, 
investment in peace operations (the 
withdrawal from MINURCAT2 
notwithstanding) and peace building 
efforts. In shaping this new paradigm, the 
                                                 
2 The UN Mission in the Central African Republic 
and Chad. 
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government will be constrained both by the 
emerging trend to subordinate 
development goals to concerns with 
climate and security, and by the tendency 
to focus on effectiveness in terms of 
outputs rather than outcomes. A related 
constraint is the level of fragmentation of 
Norwegian development policy (see box 5 
below). To be able to shape the future 
paradigm on development issues, broadly 
defined, strategic choices and priorities 
must be made. Despite much talk about 
such prioritization, the trend seems to be 
towards more, not less, fragmentation.3  
 
 
 
Given that part of the challenge to the 
prevailing paradigm comes from emerging 
powers there are good reasons to use a re-
think of and exploration of new strategies 
for development policies as a platform to 
build alliances with these powers that are 
of strategic importance for Norway also on 
other issues (China, India, Brazil etc).  
 
While support for development aid remains 
relatively stable (a slight decrease in sup-
port), the public’s assessment of aid effi-
ciency is declining. If this continues, the 
legitimacy of the 1% of budget aim of 
Norwegian policy might be at peril. It is 
difficult to overemphasize the importance 
                                                 
3 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Norway had 
around 70% of its ODA focused on the top 20% 
recipients. From 2005 to 2008, the number dropped 
from 50% to 40%. 
of publicly showing concrete results in 
terms of impact, putting greater weight on 
accountability also towards the “objects” 
for development, and to gear aid more to-
wards cross-sectoral and project based de-
velopment aid in order to facilitate this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5: Aid Project Fragmentation UK, 
Canada and Norway 2008 
Number of projects  
  
Canada   2 049    
UK    2 460    
Norway   4 208    
 
  ODA USD Mill/Project 
Canada     2.34 
UK    4.67 
Norway    0.94 
 
Source: Gulrajani 2010 
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6. Cross-cutting trends and the 
implications for diplomacy 
 
As has been indicated throughout the re-
port, there are some cross-cutting trends 
implicitly present in the more issue-
specific or substantive areas that the report 
has covered. In continuation, we elaborate 
on these trends, as they have come through 
in the thematic sections above, before 
specifying their general implications for 
Norwegian foreign- and development pol-
icy.  
 
Numerous authors have over the last dec-
ades pointed to the presence of a global, 
neoliberal political regime, including as-
sumptions of universal human rights, the 
free operations of markets and movement 
of capital, development economics, and 
transplants of “good governance” agendas 
including liberal state institutions and the 
Rule of Law. This overall liberal policy 
environment, in social affairs as well as 
regarding peace operations, has as one of 
its prerequisites a strong focus on agents 
other than states. From military affairs to 
development, the agents involved are in-
creasingly both quasi-state and non-state 
actors. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that the state is loosing power rela-
tive to other agents. Much of the literature 
on globalization and increasing intercon-
nectedness, often assumes that the state is 
becoming less central to world politics, and 
that they are somehow “loosing power” 
(e.g. Held and McGrew 2002). However, 
non-state agents are increasingly impor-
tant, not because they will of necessity 
pursue policies or have agendas that di-
verge strongly from state policies, but be-
cause state policies will inevitably involve 
working with, through, and towards such 
actors (Neumann and Sending 2010). To 
take but one example, the US state con-
ducts much of its warfare through contrac-
tors and the Norwegian state conducts 
much of its development policy through 
International and non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs). It is argued that such 
policies weaken the state, but this should 
not be seen as a zero-sum game where one 
looses and the other gains power, but as a 
change in the very relationship between 
state and society. This report rather sug-
gests that working through non-state actors 
can strengthen the state, as the state can get 
more done more efficiently working indi-
rectly through associations. In short, the 
ways in which governing is done are 
changing.  
 
“Non-state agents are increasingly 
important, not because they will 
necessarily pursue policies that dif-
fers from states’, but because state 
policies will inevitably involve work-
ing with and through such agents” 
 
What is more, the rise of “identity politics” 
on the local level, based on the self-
conceptualizations and interests of minori-
ties or other social groups or movements, 
combined with exceptional economic 
growth makes state or national action in 
isolation more difficult. As power becomes 
diversified and diffuse, legitimacy be-
comes even more important. It is the only 
way to appeal to disparate actors on the 
world stage. For a policy to be sustainable 
and effective, it needs to be legitimate - the 
capacity of actors notwithstanding. Mecha-
nisms outside of states and the formal institu-
tions are increasingly gaining legitimacy.  
 
Consequentially, the importance of trans-
national policy networks and innovation in 
new forms of governance is a major trend. 
The academic literature on global govern-
ance and on globalization find that, in-
creasingly, decision-making power, alli-
ances, and innovation in forms of govern-
ance take place not within specific actors, 
but within transnational networks organ-
ized around specific issues. To understand 
who has power, how influence is exer-
cised, and how new forms of governance 
and regulation are being suggested, negoti-
ated and tested, one will need to focus on 
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networks. Moreover, in these networks, 
individuals – with backing from the institu-
tions they represent – matter. Cases in 
point are Norwegian diplomats with a par-
ticular standing on an issue or in a region 
due to expertise and personal relations. 
Such networks are often tied in with formal 
organizations, such as the UN or the World 
Bank, but any one actor does not dominate 
them. Identifying such networks and how 
they function is central for an appreciation 
of how, when, and where Norwegian inter-
ests can best be promoted globally. 
 
The importance of transnational policy 
networks is closely associated with another 
crosscutting trend, namely the blurring of 
traditional distinctions between public and 
private, state and non-state, western and 
non-western, developing and developed, 
security and development. Received cate-
gories for understanding and acting in the 
world will be less relevant. The upshot of 
this is that although traditional entities 
(states, international organizations) and 
processes (inter-state diplomacy) remain 
important, new and different arenas and 
forms of governing will emerge as central. 
To see when and where, it is important to 
be sensitive to “hybrid” entities – public-
private partnerships being but one example 
– and their defining features.   
 
Some examples of hybridization are the 
well-known security/development nexus, 
how “humanitarian space” is being chal-
lenged by politicization from within (hu-
man rights) and militarization from the 
outside. Moreover, the roles of diplomats 
and bureaucracies are becoming increas-
ingly intertwined with other social spheres 
and professions, as they are forced to inter-
act with new issue areas, actors, and proc-
esses.  
 
A further crosscutting tendency is the in-
creasing realization that solutions to ever 
more complex and interrelated trends can 
no longer be found in the free operations of 
markets, or liberal principles in general. 
Tendencies of more restrictions put on 
typical liberal policies can be identified, in 
both finance, security, development, and 
the environment/economy. Examples can 
be illiberal practices connected with the 
Global War on Terror, increasing calls for 
regulative as opposed to marked-based 
interventions to prevent climate change 
and environmental degradation, nationali-
zation and control over natural resources, 
and stronger financial regulations of mar-
kets.   
 
What should Norway do? 
 
The 20th century was all about hierarchical 
organizations in an anarchical world. The 
21st century will increasingly be about 
networked organizations in a hierarchical 
world. (Lake 2009; Neumann and Sending 
2010).4 Sovereignty is still of crucial im-
portance, but as a principle mediating and 
translating global norms and best practices, 
not deciding and determining them. 
 
Our assessment is that the conventional 
wisdom about the rise of China and the 
decline of the US is overstated. Over the 
next two decades, Norway will be well 
served by a continued prioritization of 
good relations with the US, investments in 
international institutions like the UN, and 
with integration into the EU.  
 
“The 20th century was all about hi-
erarchical organizations in an anar-
chical world. The 21st century will 
increasingly be about networked or-
ganizations in a hierarchical world” 
 
Nevertheless, there are central challenges 
to be met concerning how such interests 
can and should be advanced. If Norwegian 
foreign policy sticks to frozen self-images 
(e.g. as a “pioneering country”) and to his-
                                                 
4 Anarchical here refers to sovereignty being the 
primary organizing principles. Hierarchical here 
refers to liberal forms of governing being dominant, 
with sovereignty conditional upon global standards.  
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torically established ways of operating 
(e.g. supporting UN organizations on prin-
ciple), its influence and effectiveness in 
operating with new and old allies, and in 
new and old global and regional arenas, 
will be significantly reduced.  
 
Norway’s timely investment in a humani-
tarian portfolio, including disaster relief 
and third-party mediating roles, allows 
Norway the role of information broker in a 
global context. Brokers are imperative be-
cause information is insufficient, and the 
more uncertain the situation is, the more 
they are needed. In a complex environ-
ment, Norway’s symbolic capital as a 
trusted broker will be valued.  
 
“Norway is well positioned to help 
shape an emerging regime that is 
less absolutist and more pragmatic” 
 
However, Norway’s position as a humani-
tarian great power and trusted broker will 
not be maintained if one does not change 
established practices: The liberally ori-
ented paradigm for addressing fragile 
states, poverty and the like will be chal-
lenged by changes internal to security, de-
velopment and humanitarian policy, and by 
changes external to it, for example the in-
creasing role of China and others. This 
may undermine the market value of Nor-
way’s positions, since it is largely propor-
tional to the liberal regime. Nevertheless, 
Norway is well positioned to help shape an 
emerging regime that is less absolutist and 
more pragmatic.  
 
Moreover, Norway should prioritize efforts 
to innovate on how to govern more effec-
tively with and through non-state actors 
without thereby marginalizing the central-
ity of established international institutions 
such as the UN. The UN can be used as a 
tool to effectively address new challenges, 
but it often requires using the UN in differ-
ent ways than is presently the norm. The 
UN represents embedded legitimacy that is 
critically important, but its legitimacy is 
being challenged. Other arenas (such as the 
G20) are emerging, and might be used to 
addressing pressing global challenges in 
ways that are more efficient. Moreover, 
transnational networks of governmental 
and non-governmental professional actors 
with shared interests and complementary 
expertise are often where new ideas flour-
ish. Harnessing the power of such net-
works to innovate on governance, and 
bringing them into contact with the UN 
system, should be a priority for Norway. 
The same goes for the interface between 
regional organizations and the UN, where 
there is potential for integrating the re-
gional with the global, thereby strengthen-
ing the UN.  
 
Diplomats everywhere will be forced to 
reorient from a reactive to a pro-active 
mode of operation. Relevant and alterna-
tive apparatuses for knowledge production 
and implementation of global politics are 
on the surge:  NGO communities, in-house 
expertise of transnational corporations 
(TNCs), IOs, journalists, defense intellec-
tuals, pundits, lawyers, and the list goes on.  
This increasingly forces diplomats to work 
hard and pro-actively in order to remain 
the ones who define what the world looks 
like, what to do, and how to do it.  
 
It is unlikely that Norway will be able to 
shape major reforms in IOs. But Norway 
can contribute to new forms of governance 
linked to IOs (not controlled by them). 
Here, Norwegian traditions for close rela-
tionships between NGOs, research institu-
tions and grass-roots organizations are a 
source of strength. It secures legitimacy for 
foreign policy decisions in the absence of 
public debate, but it also raises the ques-
tion of accountability vis a vis Parliament, 
whose role in shaping and overseeing for-
eign and development policy is arguably 
limited. Norway should take increasing 
risks to innovate and invest in transnational 
governance networks and to position itself 
in the relevant relations and networks.  
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“Diplomats everywhere will be 
forced to reorient from a reactive to 
a pro-active mode of operation” 
 
The obvious response is for diplomats to 
plan and act in advance of others. Another 
obvious response to a growing deterritori-
alization of global politics (the weakening 
of ties between culture and space because 
of changing interconnections and actors’ 
fuzzy boundaries) and the proliferation of 
relevant actors is to adopt a more project-
oriented mode of organization, which will 
allow an immediate presence in a higher 
number of processes. Influence will de-
pend on issue-specific knowledge, trust, 
and contacts in each issue-area. This means 
that specialization of diplomatic training 
and postings will be more important than 
the ideal of the “generalist”. A lag is open-
ing up between Norwegian diplomacy and 
other agents in this respect, even in Nor-
way. For example, the Norwegian General 
Staff has long ago adopted the principle of 
the matrix organization, pooling people 
with specialist but similar skills into spe-
cific working arrangements.
 - 36 -
Conclusions 
 
ISSUE Almost certain Likely Uncertain Unlikely 
State system 
Continued US unipolarity, 
but increasingly con-
strained by importance of 
new agents,  
Slower, but continuous rise 
of China, greater Asian 
regionalism, proliferation 
of political identities 
BRICs challenging international sys-
tem 
Genuine multipolarity 
Security 
Scaling down in Afgani-
stan/Iraq, more actors and 
partnerships, intrastate 
conflicts  
 
Move away from liberal 
state building, fragile states 
still important issue, risk of 
nuclear proliferation  
Failed states will diminish as “global 
security goods” issue, re-emergence of 
violent conflicts over resources, nu-
clear arms race in middle east, weak-
ening of traditional alliances  
Major, interstate great 
power war 
Climate, env., 
and resources 
Increasing in importance 
and effect, resource short-
ages, increasing CO2 
emissions 
 
 
Failure of carbon market, 
China increasingly respon-
sible stakeholder and trend-
setter, new financial 
mechanisms 
Population movements in the millions, 
substantial climate reparations scheme 
(> 50 billion USD/year), resource na-
tionalism increase potential of ten-
sions between great powers 
Comprehensive and 
Global environmental 
“New Deal”, major emis-
sions cuts by US 
 
Intl. Org. 
Decreasing importance in 
some issue areas 
Decreasing importance in 
general  
X new powers more integrated, as 
they become bigger players 
Strong leadership in the 
int. community adapts 
and revives global institu-
tions  
Development 
China and India more im-
portant players, larger 
cross-sectoral focus, re-
duced agricultural produc-
tivity 
 
Scaling down to ”tradi-
tional aid”, attractive new 
development models 
(China)  
Major decrease in legitimacy of de-
velopment aid, both in donor countries 
and recipients due to resentment and 
lack of accountability 
 
Finance and 
ec. 
Transfer of wealth from 
the West to the East, en-
ergy transition away from 
oil 
Increasing economic power 
of Indonesia, Turkey, Iran 
Relatively inexpensive energy transi-
tion, comeback of mercantilism 
National bankruptcies 
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Population 
Increase, older population 
in Europe, China, Japan, to 
a lesser extent in the US 
 
Increase to 7-8 billion   
China 
Rising living standards, 
rise in science and tech., 
pop. growth and urbaniza-
tion, exploding energy 
demand 
Increasing globalization of 
trade and demand for Chi-
nese natural resources 
Levelling of China-“the West” as re-
sponsible stakeholders 
Reaching US level on 
major indicators 
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